puzzling finding is straightforward to explain : Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (FWZ) and Davig and Leeper (DL) study determinacy of equilibrium in different models.
Perhaps more importantly, the FWZ solutions also rest on cross-equation restrictions between behavioral relations and the exogenous driving process. As a consequence of this rather special assumption, the processes governing the exogenous variables must be a particular function of all the parameters of the model-private and policyundermining the sharp distinctions among "deep parameters" that are typical in optimizing models.
1 With these conventional distinctions abandoned, it is difficult to ascribe economic interpretations to FWZ's additional solutions. We, therefore, disagree with FWZ's conclusion that there is "no economic reason to prefer one subset of fundamental equilibria over another." The new Keynesian model with linearized private sector relations and a switching monetary policy rule is the laboratory for our approach. We specify that setup as
We will refer to this representation as model "QL," for quasi-linear. It has an appropriate log-linearization of the underlying non-linear model describing private sector behavior, the first two equations, but the monetary policy rule, the third equation, is non-linear. Equilibria in these models include expectations formation effects that capture how behavior in one regime spills over to affect equilibrium outcomes in other regimes.
It is straightforward to solve the QL model using the method of undetermined coefficients. That solution method, however, is silent on whether the solution is unique. To derive conditions for determinacy of equilibrium, DL rewrite expectations by distributing probability mass for the two possible regimes, s t = 1, 2, across the conditional expectations for inflation and output as follows
for inflation is similar to the approaches in Stephen Gordon and Pascal St-Amour (2000) and Ravi Bansal and Hao Zhou (2002) . These expressions for expectations strike us as completely natural, particularly since we cannot take a first-order approximation to the policy rule because the reaction coefficients are not differentiable in the state variable.
The benefit of writing expectations as in (1)- (2) is that after substituting the expressions for expectations into (QL), one obtains the following linear representation
where Y t contains regime-dependent values for inflation and output, η t are the regimedependent one-step-ahead forecast errors, and u t are the fundamental shocks (see our original paper for additional details). We refer to this representation as model "L" for linear, since it is a linear system of expectational difference equations. The coefficient matrices embed the transition probabilities governing regime change and 
where y t = [π t , x t ] , u t are fundamental shocks and ω t is an autoregressive component that affects the equilibrium at time t. The solution in (3) consists of two parts: the MSV solution, G st u t , and the non-MSV part, ω t . Because ω t is a distributed lag of u t , u t−1 , u t−2 , . . ., the autoregressive term embodies the minimum state, u t , that suffices to construct a solution to model QL plus the entire history of the fundamental shocks, u t−s , s > 0. The volatility of the non-MSV component is not uniquely determined, since M st,s t−1 can be any 1 × 2 real matrix. Λ st is zero when s t corresponds to the active monetary regime and |Λ st | < 1 when s t corresponds to the passive regime.
Below, we refer to (3)-(4) as the FWZ solution.
To keep the solution bounded, FWZ require that the autoregressive parameters of the non-MSV term, Λ st , change precisely when regime changes. The serial correlation properties of the non-MSV component must switch in a manner that is perfectly synchronized with changes in the monetary policy regime. In an example in section V of FWZ's comment, the matrix V in (3) is determined by the eigenvector of the system in the passive regime, while Λ st is determined by the associated eigenvalue and the probability of policy remaining passive if it is already passive. Evidently, the persistence and volatility of the non-MSV part of the solution depend, not on a hypothesized exogenous process, but on an "exogenous" process whose properties depends on all the parameters in the model. One possible way of interpreting the non-MSV solution, albeit somewhat artificially, is that shifts in monetary policy may also trigger shifts in the serial correlation structure of the shocks. We certainly advocate modeling policy regime change as triggered by economic developments. This is the approach that Davig and Leeper (2006a) take when they model periods when the central bank may move to a strongly active regime as a consequence of high and rising inflation. However, there is no reason to imagine that plausible methods for endogenizing regime change are consistent with the cross-equation restrictions that the non-MSV solutions require. In fact, studies optimal monetary policy responses to Markov switching in the structure of the private economy and finds that policy rules may or may not display switching, depending on exactly how the optimal policy problem is posed.
Although it is possible for optimal policy switching to be correlated with switches in private behavior, optimal policy choices surely will not support the introduction of the additional free parameters in the elements of M st,s t−1 in (4).
What does the non-MSV solution in (3) and (4) It is also clear that the MSV solution attains outcomes that are impossible in linear models without regime change. Consider DL's simple Fisherian economy, with the monetary policy rule i t = α(s t )π t , where s t is the regime at t, α(s t = 1) = α 1 , and α(s t = 2) = α 2 . Posit that α 1 , α 2 , and the transition probabilities governing the policy regime switching satisfy the long-run Taylor principle, so that the bounded equilibrium is unique. The solution for inflation when the real interest rate, r t , is an i.i.d random variable, is given by
where α 1 > 1 is the active policy regime and 0 < α 2 < 1 is the passive regime. DL
show that α 2 can be arbitrarily close to 0 and the variance of inflation in regime 2-and unconditionally-can be arbitrarily large, yet policy satisfies the long-run Taylor Walker for helpful conversations and Jess Benhabib for useful communications on this topic.
1 The "exogenous" driving process in FWZ's solution is a moving average of past fundamental shocks. The serial correlation properties of this term are subject to cross-equation restrictions and, therefore, depend on the "deep parameters" describing preferences and technology. (2003), Davig (2003) , Hess Chung, Davig, and Leeper (2007) .
